Dear Ambassador Flor,

Excellencies, Colleagues and Comrades,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the German Defence Attaché Staff in Beijing, I would like to thank you all for attending this year’s reception on the occasion of the foundation of the Bundeswehr 70 years ago. Seven decades that were shaped from its early beginning by the Cold War, later by two paramount and very distinctive changes: first, by German unification, second by Russia´s illegitimate aggression and ongoing cruel war on Ukraine. As I experienced all three periods as a soldier, I would like to share my personal views on these. However, before I start, I want to welcome Maj Gen Xiong Mingfeng and his delegation from the Academy of Military Science. In addition, I want to thank SenCol JI Wanli and Col LIU Di from the European desk of OIMC for their support, particularly when we have to find pragmatic solutions for our bilateral annual program. We do appreciate your individual helpful and constructive way. Therefore, I look forward to continuing to work together in the next year.

Ladies and gentlemen, when I joined the Bundeswehr, in the early eighties, the Bundeswehr had finished the buildup of massive, highly modernized Forces: an Army with 36 Brigades with more than 5000 tanks, about 1000 aircraft, 200 ships and submarines, 500.000. active personnel. The mission was to deter an attack on West-Germany´s territory by conventionally overwhelming aggressive Warsaw Pact Forces. Along the German inner Border the Bundeswehr together with troops from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the U.S., permanently prepositioned in Germany, had to stop and to delay an attack, close to the frontline from predetermined defensive positions. It was a large scale- all in defensive war scenario which included theoretically as ultima ratio tactical nuclear weapons. It was an optimized defensive war on our soil. Mobility and maneuverability were defined by our borders focusing on readiness. We were 100% integrated into NATO´s Command and Control structure. At that time, tensions grew due to the positioning of Soviet medium range nuclear ballistic missiles (SS 20) covering Central Europe. NATO decided to counter this strategic imbalance by stationing U.S. missiles on West Germany´s soil. Within the society this political decision was quite controversial.

For the very first time I experienced in depth, what freedom of speech, freedom to demonstrate really means and why this stands for democracy. For some years a strong German peace movement used its constitutional rights to demonstrate against that decision with sometimes up to 500.000 people, sometimes military facilities were blocked. This made its way of course into my private life, challenged by friends. It also became part of our training as a so called „responsible citizen in uniform“. The latter offered me legal and constitutional knowledge challenged by quite open and liberal debates.

Did I, in the following years, personally feel deeply threatened? Not really, first, because, I was young, but second, at the same time, next to our and NATO´s credible deterrence posture through strength, candid strategic security dialogs were ongoing. When President Gorbatchov, together with President Reagan, agreed to withdraw these heavy disputed missiles on both sides in 1987, the overall security landscape improved enormously. It seemed: whenever tensions emerge, they can be managed. Nevertheless, the opening of the dividing wall in a peaceful moment only two years later took me by surprise. The first paramount change for us loomed over the horizon as we lost our major opponent after 40 years. The Warsaw Pact started to disappear. In the united Germany one army of two former bitter enemies emerged. Large scale frontline defense capabilities for „Worst-Case-Scenarios“ became less relevant over the years. The Bundeswehr focused on its internal reform while the mission changed significantly. Out of area missions became now the defining imperative: highly deployable, mobile and tailorable forces were needed.

The first Out of Area missions started in a primarily supporting roles. When the UN asked NATO for a military reaction in the aftermath of the killing in Srebrenica, Bosnia and the shelling of a market in Sarajevo in 1995 with many killed civilians, it was the first time after WW II German pilots fired missiles. Later, due to an enormous declining defense budget, the Bundeswehr disposed capabilities and capacities. Also, instead of deploying in the North Atlantic or Baltic Sea, our Navy enforced sanctions in the Mediterranean, countered terrorism and piracy off the Horn of Africa. In Afghanistan we fought as a very reliable partner to the very last day alongside the United States and our allied partners for uninterrupted 19 years. There, most prominently one could see the effect of this transformation. Troops, tasked with nation building and peace enforcement at the same time, had to be deployed and sustained to a fighting region 5000 km away. There „counter-insurgency“ became the „magic“ thinking. The price tag: we lost the ability for a large-scale territorial defense scenario at home.

That deficiency, however, was reasonable due to the new security landscape: significant arms reductions, or trust building mechanisms like Partnership for Peace Program.

Today, however, peace in Europe ended, because of Russia´s illegitimate aggression and war on Ukraine. The old threat is back. Our core mission of national and collective defence dominates again our security concerns. The Russian threat is reality, perhaps most keenly felt by the Baltic and Nordic states bordering Russia. Together with our partners, we can counter effectively this threat, just as we did before 1989. Our and NATOs mission again is to deter. Geo-Strategically Germany again plays a crucial „staging“ role, if NATO reinforcement will be necessary. We deter by demonstrating we are stronger. That´s why the German Air Force, together with our allied partners, secures the Baltic States’ airspace or supports Poland and Romania. That´s why Germany has started to station permanently a Combat Brigade in Lithuania and support Ukraine and their people. That´s why our defence budget for the next 5 years will significantly rise from 52 bn € last year to 108 bn € next year and a further increase to 132 bn € in 2028, we bolster deterrence.

We also contribute to maritime NATO forces in the North Atlantic or in the Baltic Sea. From my military perspective this particularly means: the bridge between Europe and America is and remains crucial. Within the military we have to adapt better to the speed of innovation and lessons from Ukraine. Unmanned capabilities are vital and shape significantly the Ukrainian and future battlefields. However, these do not solve every problem in combat. We must not fall again in a simplistic view about future war scenarios. Tanks, aircraft and ships are not obsolete. What we have to do is to embrace technology much more strongly and faster. Those, who master best and fastest, will succeed. But it should be also clear, that „the fog of war“, as addressed by Clausewitz will not be mastered by technology alone. At the core are the people. We the people have to prepare for the worst in order to deter it.

Thank you for your attention.